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COMMENTS'
RESTRICTED VENUE IN SUITS AGAINST
NATIONAL BANKS:
A PROCEDURAL ANACHRONISM
Section 94 of the National Bank Act1 has been interpreted to restrict,
venue in most actions brought against national banks to the district or
county in which the bank is headquartered. The statutory provision
and judicial engraftments thereon have been the subject of continuing
criticism, prompted primarily by the advent of modern banking prac-
tices.2 The policy question at the heart of the controversy is whether
a bank conducting geographically diffuse operations should be made
amenable to suit in forums coextensive with its sphere of operations
rather than being shielded from suits instituted away from its home
office.
In the century since its enactment, the bank venue restriction has been
applied almost uniformly in favor of the banks, as, with but minor
exceptions, courts have sustained objections to venue where a suit agains t
a national bank has been brought in a district or county other than that
of the bank's principal place of business. Such denial to a plaintiff of a
1. 12 U.S.C. § 94 (1970). The present statute was derived from the National Bank
Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, § 30, 13 Stat. 108, and the Act of Feb. 18, 1875, ch. 80,
§ 1, 18 Star. 320. Enactment of the National Bank Act in a period of generally unsound
bank performance was motivated by a broad demand for bonds left over from the
Civil War and by the need to establish a uniform bank note currency D. Carson &
P. Cootner, The Structure of Competition in Commercial Banking in the United States,
n PaxvATE FiNANCIAL INSTITUnONS 59-61 (1963). See L. CHANDLER, TE EcoNocs OF-
MoNEY AND BANKING 144 (4th ed. 1964). The venue provision was intended to prevent
the interruption of business of national banks wuch rmght result from their being
forced by process to send their books to distant forums. First Nat'l Bank v. Morgan;
132 U.S. 141 (1889).
2. A valuable commentary, Note, An Assault on the Venue Sanctuary of National
Banks, 34 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 765 (1966), traces changes m related laws which have
accompanied advances in banking practices. It also suggests that when the venue pro-
vision was enacted, Congress could not have envisioned the current level of full service
branch banking and the extensive litigation resulting therefrom, since national banks
originally were not perrmtted to maintain branches away from their charter locations.
Today, national banks may establish such branches. See 44 Stat. 1228, as amended, 12
U.S.C. § 36 (1970); 48 Stat. 190, as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1970).
3. In 1970, 4,614 national banks operated 11,993 branch banks. RAND McNALLY INTER--
NATIONAL, BANxERS Dnz.croRy 70 (1971).
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forum convenient to him often results in hus foregoing maintenance of
his action because of the prohibitive cost and inconvemence of trying the
case at a distant location. The tempo of the controversy over repeal of
section 94 has increased with several recent decisions, particularly that
of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Helco, Inc. v. First
National City Bank,- in which it was held that a bank does not waive
the privilege afforded by the bank venue provision when it establishes a
branch bank m a district or county other than that of its home office.
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 94
Section 94 provides:
Actions and proceedings against any association under this chap-
ter may be had in any district or Territorial court of the United
States held within the district in which such association may be
established, or in any State, county, or municipal court in the
county or city in which said association is located having jurisdic-
tion in similar cases.5
Although use of the word "may" would appear to indicate that the
section is merely permissive, it is well established that operation of the
venue provision is mandatory 6
The words "established" and "located," as used in the Act, are defined
interchangeably by the courts. 7 Since the inception of the venue pro-
4. 470 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1972).
5. 12 US.C. § 94 (1970) (emphasis supplied).
6. Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Robertson, 372 U.S. 591 (1963); Mercantile Nat'l Bank v.
Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555 (1963); United States Nat'l Bank v. Hill, 434 F.2d 1019 (9th
Cir. 1970); Bruns, Nordeman & Co. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 394 F.2d 300
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 855 (1968); Buffum v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 192 F.2d 58
(7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 944 (1952); Leonardi v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 81 F.2d
19 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 677 (1936); Rome v. Eltra Corp., 297 F Supp. 314
(E.D. Pa. 1969); Levin v. Great W Sugar Co., 274 F Supp. 974 (D.N.J. 1967); General
Elec. Credit Corp. v. James Talcott, Inc., 271 F Supp. 699 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Insurance
Co. of N. America v. Allied Crude Vegetable Oil Ref. Corp., 89 N.J. Super. 518, 215
A.2d 579 (1965); Brumm v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 213 Pa. Super. 443, 249 A.2d 916
(1968).
7. Reaves v. Bank of America, 352 F Supp. 745, 747 (S.D. Cal. 1973). However, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina has held that Congress, having used "established"
with reference to suits in federal courts and "located" with reference to actions brought
m state courts, must have intended to draw a distinction between the terms. The court
concluded, in Security Mills of Asheville, Inc. v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., N.A.,
281 N.C. 525, 189 S.E.2d 266 (1972), that a bank is "located" and thus subject to suit
in state court in any county in which it has a branch office.
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vision, the judiciary has adhered steadfastly to the view that a national
bank is established m only one place-its principal place of business, as
recited in its charter."
It has been argued9 that the act of Congress authorizing national banks
to establish branches away from their charter locations 0 manifested an
intent that banks also be considered "established" at their branch offices.
Although most decisions have ignored or rejected such arguments,1
some courts recently have suggested the desirability of holding that a
bank is established at its branch offices as well as its home office. Nev-
ertheless, even these courts have felt constrained by stare decisis to follow
the traditional view, relegating to Congress the burden of taking re-
medial steps.12
AVOIDING APPLICATION OF THE BANK VENUE PRovisioN
Local Action Exception
The single widely recognized exception to the restrictions on venue
imposed by section 94 applies where an action is local, rather than transi-
8. First Nat'l Bank v. United States Dist. Court, 468 F.2d 180 (9th Cir. 1972); United
States Nat'l Bank v. Hill, 434 F.2d 1019, 1020 (9th Cir. 1970); American Sur. Co. v. Bank
of Cal., 133 F.2d 160 (9th Cir. 1943); Reaves v. Bank of America, 352 F Supp. 745 (S.D.
Cal. 1973). See Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 467 (1947); Buffum v. Chase Nat'! Bank,
192 F.2d 58, 60 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 944 (1952); Leonardi v. Chase
Nat'l Bank, 81 F.2d 19, 22 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 677 (1936); Berman v. Thom-
son, 284 F Supp. 521, 524 (N.D. IM. 1968); General Elec. Credit Corp. v. James Tal-
cott, Inc., 271 F Supp. 699, 703 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Lip-
pert Bros., 233 F Supp. 650, 653 (D. Neb. 1964).
9. Helco, Inc. v. First Nat'! City Bank, 333 F Supp. 1289, 1292 (D.V.. 1971), rervd,
470 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1972).
10. See note 2 supra.
11. See cases cited note 8 supra. In General Elec. Credit Corp. v. James Talcott, Inc.,
271 F Supp. 699 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), the court stated:
The further argument that Congress did not intend to prohibit suit an the
district where the branch was located, since such branches were not author-
ized when the predecessor statutes to 12 U.S.C. § 94 were passed, is fully an-
swered by the failure of Congress, in the years since such branches were
authorized to amend the venue provisions of the National Bank Act to en-
large them accordingly.
Id. at 703 n.4.
12. See Helco, Inc. v. First Nat'l City Bank, 470 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1972); United
States Nat'! Bank v. Hill, 434 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir. 1970); of. Bruns, Nordeman & Co. v.
American Nat'! Bank & Trust Co., 394 F.2d 300 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 855
(1968). In Hill it was stated: "The decision reached by the judge may reflect the more
desirable position, but if the national banks and the courts are to be placed in that posi-
tion, it must be the Congress that puts them there." 434 F.2d at 1020-21.
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tory, in nature. The local action exception permits a suit required by
law to be instituted in a particular district or county to be maintained
against a bank even though the forum is not that where the bank is
established within the meaning of section 94.13
The Supreme Court has noted that local actions, which generally
involve interests in real property, are "in the nature of suits in rem, and
are to be prosecuted where the thing on which they are founded is
situated." '4 The rationale for the exception arises from recognition that
the venue provision would preclude entirely suit against a national bank
if the action were one which, by its nature, could be brought only in
a forum apart from where the bank is established.1 5 In conformity with
this reasoning, the Supreme Court has held the local action exception
inapplicable where a statute permits an action, although local in nature,
to be brought in any county where the defendant bank can be found.16
The concept of a local action apparently was expanded in the 1969
decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Chateau La-
fayette Apartments, Inc. v. Meadow Brook National Bank.17 The plain-
tiff, alleging usury, sought cancellation or reformation of a mortgage
and mortgage note on certain immovable property State law provided
that an action to reform a mortgage on immovables could be brought
only in the parish where the mortgaged property was located. The
bank, however, asserted that the suit should be viewed as an in personam
action seeking cancellation of the underlying mortgage note. The dissent
agreed, arguing that because the relief sought was alteration of a contrac-
tual relationship, the action was not in rem and a federal court in the
13. The exception was first enunciated by the Supreme Court in Casey v. Adams,
102 U.S. 66 (1880), which involved a proceeding to cancel a mortgage on real property
See also Fresno Nat'l Bank v. Superior Court, 83 Cal. 491, 24 P 157 (1890); Continental
Nat'l Bank v. Folsom, 78 Ga. 449, 3 S.E. 269 (1887). Since Casey, however, the Supreme
Court has intimated against the vitality of the local action exception to the venue rule.
Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555 (1963); Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S.
461, 467 (1947); First Nat'l Bank v. Morgan, 132 U.S. 141 (1889). Nevertheless, lower
federal and state courts coutinue to recognize the exception. See, e.g., Helco, Inc. v.
First Nat'l City Bank, 470 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1972); Chateau Lafayette Apartments, Inc.
v. Meadow Brook Nat'l Bank, 416 F.2d 301 (5th Cir. 1969); Gregor J. Schaefer Sons v.
Watson, 26 App. Div. 2d 659, 272 N.Y.S.2d 790 (1966).
14. Casey v. Adams, 102 U.S. 66, 68 (1880).
15. Id. See Bruns, Nordeman & Co. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 394
F.2d 300, 304 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 855 (1968).
16. The Court stated: "[Tihis is a considerably different kind of suit from one
to determine interests in property at its situs " Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Robertson,
372 U.S. 591, 594 (1963)
17. 416 F.2d 301 (5th Cir. 1969).
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state in which the bank was established could grant relief without
having jurisdiction over the res. Nevertheless, the majority of the court
held that the action, although "mixed under Louisiana law concepts,"
was to be considered local, since the effect of the action, were plaintiff
ultimately successful, would "be upon real property subject to the mort-
gage." 18 The holding in Chateau thus would appear to permit a plain-
tiff, capable of obtaining relief by couching his suit in terms of either
a local or transitory action, to take advantage of the local action excep-
tion to section 94 by appropriate framing of his complaint.
Dictum in a recent decision of the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit indicates that a garnishment action to seize funds deposited by
a debtor in a branch of a national bank might be treated as a local action.19
The local action exception thus might extend to quasi in rem actions
against personal property as well as to suits involving real property
However, even in an expanded form, the local action concept could not
temper the effect of operation of section 94 in the multitude of suits
against national banks involving breaches of contract, frauds, securities
frauds, and torts.20
Repeal by Implication
Arguments have been advanced that section 94 has been repealed by
implication through enactment of other federal statutes containing venue
provisions. Section 1391 of Tide 28, for example, provides that venue
in a suit against a corporation is proper in any judicial district in which
the corporation is doing business. 21 However, the courts consistently
have refused to permit section 1391, applicable to corporations gen-
erally, to supplant section 94, holding that the latter is specific in its
application to national banks.2 Similarly, it has been held that the pro-
18. Id. at 305.
19. Helco, Inc. v. First Nae'l City Bank, 470 F.2d 883, 885 n5 (3d Cir. 1972), citing
Chateau Lafayette Apartments, Inc. v. Meadow Brook Nat'l Bank, 416 F.2d 301 (5th
Cir. 1969).
20. See First Nat'l Bank v. Umted States Dist. Court, 468 F.2d 180 (9th Cir. 1972).
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1970), provides in pertinent part: "A corporation may be sued
in any judicial district in which it is doing business, and such judicial district shall
be regarded as the residence of such corporation for venue purposes."
22. Bruns, Nordeman & Co. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 394 F.2d 300 (2d
Cir.), cert. dened, 393 U.S. 855 (1968); Buffum v. Chase Nar'l Bank, 192 F.2d 58 (7th
Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 944 (1952); Levin v. Great W Sugar Co., 274 F Supp.
974 (D.N.J. 1967); General Elec. Credit Corp. v. James Talcott, Inc., 271 F Supp. 699
(S.D.N.Y. 1966); International Refugee Organization v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust
19731
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visions of rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure s do not
affect the mandatory operation of section 94 in cases involving third
party complaints against banks established outside the jurisdiction of
the forum.2 4
Courts have experienced greater difficulty in determining the effect
on section 94 of the specialized venue provisions of the securities acts.25
In Levin v. Great Western Sugar Co., 2 the plaintiff in an action in New
Jersey attempted to join as defendants certain national banks which did
no business in that state, alleging that the banks, together with other
corporations, had violated the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Under
section 27 of that Act, venue is proper in any district where an illegal
transaction occurred.27 Thus, under this provision, venue would have
been proper in New Jersey even though none of the defendant banks
were established in that state.
Although noting that courts generally seek to avoid finding implied
repeals of legislation,28 the court in Levin concluded that section 27
supplanted section 94, the two venue provisions being totally repugnant
& Say. Ass'n, 86 F Supp. 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) See Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra
Prods. Corp, 353 U.S. 222 (1957); Stonite Prods. Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561
(1942).
23. FED. R. Civ. P 14(a) provides in pertinent part: "At any time after commence-
ment of the action a defending party, as a third-party plaintiff, may cause a summons
and complaint to be served upon a person not a party to the action who is or may be
liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him." FED. R. Civ. P 14(b)
provides: "When a counterclaim is asserted against a plaintiff, he may cause a third
party to be brought in under circumstances which under this rule would entitle a de-
fendant to do so."
24. Swiss Israel Trade Bank v. Mobley, 319 F Supp. 374 (S.D. Ga. 1970) (attempt to
implead New York banking association in action brought in Georgia district court
barred by section 94).
25. Securities Act of, 1933 § 22(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1970); Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970).
26. 274 F Supp. 974 (D.N.J. 1967).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970), provides in pertinent part: "Any criminal proceeding
[under this chapter] may be brought in the district wherein any act or transaction con-
stituting the violation occurred. Any suit or action to enforce any liability or duty
created by this chapter may be brought in any such district or in the district
wherein the defendant is found or transacts business "
28. 274 F Supp. at 977 See United States v. Borden & Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198-99 (1939);
Rome v. Eltra Corp, 297 F Supp. 314 (ED. Pa. 1966); General Elec. Credit Corp. v.
James Talcott, Inc., 271 F Supp. 699 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). See also Silver v. New York
Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963); United States v. Jackson, 302 U.S. 628, 631
(1938); Pasadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936); Town of Red Rock
v. Henry, 106 U.S. 596 (1882).
[Vol. 15 179
BANK VENUE RESTRICTIONS
to one another. It was reasoned that since Congress had exempted na-
tional banks from some provisions of the securities acts, 29 it would have
specifically exempted the banks from securities acts venue provisions
had it intended that section 94 of the National Bank Act should remain
the controlling provision in suits involving banks.
The decision in Levin, however, is not in accord with the weight of
authority3 ° and was rejected specifically by the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit in Bruns, Nordeman & Co. v. American National
Bank & Trust Co." The Bruns court, noting that suits involving viola-
tions of the securities laws are typically multi-defendant, recognized the
inconvenience which results where each defendant bank must be sued
only in the district in which it was established.32 Nevertheless, it was
held that section 94 must be given full effect, since after "seventy years
of highly restricted venue of actions against national banks," 33 nothing
in the legislative history of the securities acts justified a holding of
implied repeal.3 4
Thus, with the exception of the persuasive holding in Levin that the
special venue provisions of the securities acts impliedly repealed section
94, the courts have been unwilling, in the absence of clear evidence of
legislative intent, to find that section 94 has been repealed by venue
provisions in other statutes. Hence, the existence of apparently incon-
sistent statutes affords little hope for plaintiffs attempting to avoid the
burden of compliance with section 94.
29. E.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c(a) (2), 1(2) (1970); 15 U.S.C. § 781(i) (1970).
S0. Klein v. Bower, 421 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1970); Bruns, Nordeman, & Co. v. Amen-
can Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 394 F.2d 300 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 855 (1968);
Wyndham Associates v. Bindiff, 398 F.2d 614 (2d Cir.), cert. dened, 393 U.S. 977
(1968); General Elec. Credit Corp. v. James Talcott, Inc., 271 F Supp. 699 (SD.N.Y.
1966). See Swiss Israel Trade Bank v. Mobley, 319 F Supp. 374 (S.D. Ga. 1970);
Rome v. Eltra Corp., 297 F Supp. 314 (ED. Pa. 1969). See also Berman v. Thomson,
284 F Supp. 521 (ND. Ill. 1968).
31. 394 F.2d 300 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 855 (1968).
82. The court recognized that such multiple suits, although inconvenient, were not
impossible. Casey v. Adams, 102 U.S. 66 (1880), was thus distingmshed. See notes 14-1
supra & accompanying text.
33. 394 F.2d at 303.
34. It has been suggested that when Congress passed the venue provisions of
the securities acts, it did not envision national banks as likely defendants thereunder.
Bruns, Nordeman & Co. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 394 F.2d 300, 304 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 855 (1968); General Elec. Credit Corp. v. James Talcott,
Inc, 271 F. Supp. 699, 707 (SD.N.Y. 1966). See H. R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong, ist Sess.
14 (1933); 1 L. Loss, Su-arrmEs REnuArviox 564 n.18 (2d ed. 1961).
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Waiver of Venue
Courts uniformly agree that the right conferred by section 94 can
be effectively waived by a bank. 5 Defining what conduct or acts of a
bank constitutes a waiver of the venue privilege, however, is prob-
lematic.8 0
It is necessary to observe the distinction between waiver occurring
before or after the commencement of suit. Ordinarily a bank can pre-
serve its venue privilege at trial by timely objection to improper venue.37
However, certain activities engaged in by a bank prior to the commence-
ment of suit might constitute a "voluntary and intentional relinquish-
35. Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Robertson, 372 U.S. 591 (1963); Nierbo Co. v. Bethlehem
Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165 (1939); First Nat'l Bank v. Morgan, 132 U.S. 141
(1889); Buffum v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 192 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
944 (1952); Fisher v. First Nat'1 Bank, 338 F Supp. 525 (S.D. Iowa 1972); Altman v.
Liberty Equines Corp., 322 F Supp. 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Exchange Natl Bank v.
Abramson, 45 F.R.D. 97 (D. Minn. 1968) See Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Langdeau,
371 U.S. 555 (1963); County of Okeechobee v. Florida Nat'l Bank, 112 Fla. 309, 150
So. 124 (1933); Lichtenfels v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 260 N.C. 146, 132 S.E.2d 360
(1963).
36. In Buffum v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 192 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
944 (1952), the concept of waiver was defined as follows:
Waiver is a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known existing right or privilege, which, except for such waiver, would
have been enjoyed. It may be expressed formally or it may be implied as a
necessary consequence of the waiver's conduct inconsistent with an assertion
of retention of the right. It must be proved by the party relying upon it.
And if, the only proof of intention to waive rests on what a party does or
forbears to do, his act or omissions to act should be so manifestly consistent
with and indicative of an intent to relinquish voluntarily a particular right
that no other reasonable explanation of his conduct is possible.
Id. at 60-61 (footnotes omitted).
37. FED. R. Civ. P 12(b) (3) There are a number of limitations upon the effectiveness
of a motion to dismiss on grounds of improper venue. It has been held that the venue priv-
ilege is waived if a bank, before objecting to venue, proceeds to trial and defends on
the merits. First Nat'l Bank v. Morgan, 132 U.S. 141 (1889) A similar result obtains
if the bank fails to appear and defaults. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. v. Consolidated Stone
Co., 278 U.S. 177 (1929) Where a bank voluntarily sought the forum and filed a bond
required to maintain an action, it was held to have waived its venue privilege in an
action brought against it for breach of the bond. Continental Nat'l Bank v. Folsom, 78
Ga. 449, 3 S.E. 269 (1887). Moreover, a bank that initiated its own deposition proceed-
ings and did not object to the service of interrogatories and note of issue was held to
have abandoned its right to change venue. Solum v. Farmers & Merchants Nat'l Bank,
269 Minn. 431, 131 N.W.2d 231 (1964). Finally, where a bank instituted suit as a plain-
tiff, it was held to have waived its venue privilege with respect to permissive or com-
pulsory counterclaims arising out of that suit. Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Abramson, 45
F.R.D. 97 (D. Minn. 1968).
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ment or abandonment" 3 of the venue privilege wich cannot be cured
by timely objection at trial. Thus, for example, it has been held that a
bank, by seelang and accepting court appointment as a trustee, waives
its venue right, but only in relation to suits arising out of the trust busi-
ness.39 However, the mere recitation in a contract that the laws of a
certain state are to govern the contract is not a relinquishment of the
section 94 privilege, 40 nor is carrying on business with a correspondent
bank sufficient to constitute a waiver.4 1 Moreover, the creation of a
wholly owned subsidiary to conduct a credit card business in a foreign
jurisdiction has been held not to be an abandonment of the venue priv-
ilege, even in relation to suits arising out of such business.4
The question of greatest interest with respect to waiver is whether a
bank, by establishing a branch in another jurisdiction, thereby is con-
ducting sufficient business in that jurisdiction to constitute a waiver of
the venue privilege granted by section 94.43 In Frankford Supply Co.
v. Matteo,44 it was held that a national bank, established in New Jersey,
could not require that a garnishment action involving its Philadelphia
branch be removed to its charter location in New Jersey The Frank-
ford court relied upon the following rule stated in Lapinsohn v. Lewis
Charles, InC.:45 "If a national bank avails itself of a jurisdiction by set-
ting up a [full service] branch to conduct general banking business, it
has manifested an intent to be found in that jurisdiction for purposes
of suits arising out of any business conducted there." 46
38. Buffum v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 192 F.2d 58, 60 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342
US. 944 (1952).
39. Lichtenfels v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 260 N.C. 146, 132 S.E.2d 360 (1963).
See County of Okeechobee v. Florida Nat'l Bank, 112 Fla. 309, 150 So. 124 (1933). But
4. Rome v. Eltra Corp., 297 F Supp. 314 (ED. Pa. 1966).
40. Batr v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, 175 Neb. 875, 124 N.W2d 926 (1963); Hills v.
Burnett, 175 Neb. 871, 125 N.W2d 66 (1963).
41. Bank of America v. Whitney Cent. Nael Bank, 261 US. 171 (1923).
42. Fisher v. First Nat'l Bank, 338 F Supp. 525 (SD. Iowa 1972).
43. Note, An Assault on the Venue Sanctuary of National Banks, 34 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 765, 777 (1966). See Reaves v. Bank of. America, 352 F Supp. 745 (SD. Cal. 1973);
Frankford Supply Co. v. Matteo, 305 F Supp. 794 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Security Mills of
Asheville, Inc. v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 281 N.C. 525, 189 S.E.2d 266 (1972);
Lapinsohn v. Lewis Charles, Inc., 212 Pa. Super. 185, 240 A.2d 90, cert. denied, 393 U.S.
952 (1968).
44. 305 F Supp. 794 (ED. Pa. 1969).
45. 212 Pa. Super. 185, 240 A.2d 90 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 952 (1968).
46. Id. at 193, 240 A.2d at 94-95. In Frankford Supply the argument was not advanced
that garnishment of a res m the hands of a branch bank should be treated as a local action
creating an exception to the operation of section 94. See note 19 supra & accompanying
text.
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A similar result was reached in Reaves v. Bank of America,1 a suit
brought in the Southern District of Califorma against a bank established
in San Francisco. In holding that the bank had waived its privilege to
be sued only in San Francisco, the court noted that the bank had engaged
in extensive banking activity through 66 branches in the Southern
District, had brought a significant number of lawsuits in that district,
and had not objected to venue when sued previously in the Southern
Distrct.48 The Reaves court relied on the decision of the district court
in Helco, Inc. v. First National City Bank,49 which involved a suit
brought in the Virgin Islands against a national bank chartered in New
York but engaged in full service banking in the Virgin Islands. Noting
that the defendant bank was in competition with local banks, had availed
itself of the local courts in enforcing rights growing out of its banking
business, and had available locally any records pertinent to the suit,
and that the suit posed no threat to continuity of the bank's operation
at its charter location, ° the district court in Helco concluded that the
bank had waived its section 94 privilege.
These decisions thus stand for the proposition that a bank which
operates branches and invokes the aid of the local judicial establishment
is engaged in conduct likely to result in the loss of its venue privilege.
Unfortunately, this waiver concept was emasculated recently by the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit when it reversed the district
court decision in Helco.51 Although recognizing that its decision con-
flicted with the holdings in Frankford and Lapinsohn, the appellate
court concluded that a bank does not waive its venue privilege by "es-
tablishing a branch in another location and doing business there." 52
Reliance was placed upon a series of cases in which it had been held
that a bank does not impliedly waive its venue privilege by doing busi-
ness in a foreign district.5 3 However, none of these cases involved the
47. 352 F Supp. 745 (S.D. Cal. 1973).
48. It should be noted, however, that waiver in one suit does not, by itself, consti-
tute waiver in another suit. See Buffum v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 192 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1951),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 944 (1952).
49. 333 F Supp. 1289 (D.V.I. 1971), revd, 470 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1972).
50. See the discussion in note 1 supra of the congressional purpose of preventing the
interruption of the business of national banks.
51. Helco, Inc. v. First Nat'l City Bank, 470 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1972).
52. Id. at 885.
53. Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Robertson, 372 U.S. 591 (1963); Mercantile Nat'l Bank
v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555 (1963); United States Nat'l Bank v. Hill, 434 F.2d 1019 (9th
Cir. 1970); Bruns, Nordeman & Co. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 394 F.2d 300
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conduct of business through a branch of the bank in the foreign location.
They therefore provide only tenuous support to the Helco court's
holding.
Although the reasoning in Helco is not compelling, the decision must
be recognized as the leading authority Since the court did not concern
itself with the extent of the business transacted in the foreign district, "
its decision, in effect, licenses banks to retain their venue haven while
conducting enormous business through branches in distant locations.
The decision accentuates the harshness of section 94 and emphasizes the
need for legislative change.
CONCLUSION
Although the potential for working hardship inherent in the venue
provision is widely recognized by the courts,5 the judiciary appears to
be uniformly of the opinion that reform is a matter for congressional
action.58 The American Law Institute advocates total repeal of section
94, although, in deference to an argument advanced by the Comptroller
of the Currency, the Institute has suggested a compromise 57 which would
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 855 (1968); Buffum v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 192 F.2d 58
(7th Cir. 1951), cert. demed, 342 U.S. 944 (1952); Leonardi v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 81
F.2d 19 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 677 (1936); General Elec. Credit Corp. v.
James Talcott, Inc, 271 F Supp. 699 (SD.N.Y. 1966).
54. The Helco court stated: "We do not think that the requisite intent to waive this
venue right can be implied merely from the act of doing business outside the district in
which the bank is established." 470 F.2d 883, 885 (3d Cit. 1972).
55. See, e.g., Klein v. Bower, 421 F.2d 338 (2d Cit. 1970); Bruns, Nordeman & Co. v.
American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 394 F.2d 300 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 US. 855
(1968); Fisher v. First Nat'l Bank, 338 F Supp. 525 (SD. Iowa 1972); Swiss Israel Trade
Bank v. Mobley, 319 F Supp. 374 (S.D. Ga. 1970).
In Reaves v. Bank of America, 352 F Supp. 745 (S.D. Cal. 1973), the court noted
that if the plaintiff were forced to obtain relief in the place where the bank was estab-
lished, then "the prohibitive costs of travelling and proceeding there will probably
mean that the case will have to be dropped and the merits never considered" Id. at 750.
Section 94 can also impose a burden on the judicial establishment, for example, where an
action is brought against several national banks. If the banks are established in different
jurisdictions, separate suits must be heard to resolve the matter.
56. Umted States Nat'l Bank v. Hill, 434 F2d 1019 (9th Cit. 1970); Klein v. Bower,
421 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1970); Bruns, Nordeman & Co. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co., 394 F.2d 300 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 855 (1968); Swiss Israel Trade Bank
v. Mobley, 319 F. Supp. 374 (S.D. Ga. 1970); General Elec. Credit Corp. v. James Tal-
cott, Inc., 271 F Supp. 699 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
57. Actions and proceedings against any association under this chapter may be
had in any district or Territorial court of the Umted States held within the
district m which such association may be established, or, if the action arises
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provide for suit in any district in which a bank operates a branch only
if the action arises out of business conducted in that district. The sug-
gested provision also would permit suit against multiple defendant banks
in any district where the action could have been brought against one of
them.
The Comptroller has contended that liberalization of section 94-
'would hamper the supervisory activities of his office and the operations
of the national banking system." 58 The number of records whose trans-
fer would be necessary under the Institute proposal, however, seems
likely to be insignificant since, even under the present venue statute,
records are often kept at the branch where a transaction occurs and not
at the central office." Moreover, banks presently submit to a large num-
ber of suits without asserting their venue privilege,60 and the Comptroller
is faced with the same problem whether the bank voluntarily waives its
venue privilege or is denied it by legislative reform.
The underlying policy which originally prompted the enactment of
the venue provision-protection of national banks from interruption of
business by suits brought in distant forums'i-is no longer viable. In
this age of instant communications, computerized records, simplified
duplicating, and rapid transportation, it can make little, if any, difference
in terms of business interruption whether a bank defends a suit where it
is headquartered or at the site of one of its outlying operations. 62 To the
out of business transacted in that district, n any district m which the as-
sociation has a branch office Actions and proceedings against more than
one association may be bad in any district or Territorial court of the United
States or State, county, or ninicipal court n which the action might have
been brought against any one of the associations.
ALI, STUDY OF DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 77, 412-13
(1969).
58. Memorandum of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 14, General Elec. Credit
Corp. v. James Talcott, Inc., 271 F Supp. 699 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), cited in Note, An As-
sault on the Venue Sanctuary of National Banks, 34 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 765, 773 (1966)
See ALI, STUDY OF DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 413
(1969).
59. See Reaves v. Bank of America, 352 F Supp. 745 (S.D. Cal. 1973); Frankford
Supply Co. v. Matteo, 305 F Supp. 794 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
60. See, e.g., Reaves v. Bank of America, 352 F Supp. 745 (S.D. Cal. 1973), in which
it is stated that the defendant bank had been sued 338 times in a foreign location before
it made a venue objection. Id. at 749.
61. See note 1 supra.
62. See Bruns, Nordeman & Co. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 394 F.2d 300,
302-03 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 855 (1968); Helco, Inc. v First Nat'l City Bank,
333 F Supp. 1289, 1292 (D.V. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 470 F.2d 883 (3d Cir.
1972); Lapinsohn v. Lewis Charles, Inc., 212 Pa. Super. 185, 194, 240 A.2d 90, 95 (1968).
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claimant, however, the choice of forum may have a significant and
possibly controlling effect on his ability to recover from a bank. It is
submitted, therefore, that section 94 has outlived its usefulness and should
be either repealed or modified to conform with modern banking
realities.
